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Abstract
To much hysteria from the rest of the world, the US has announced the 
launching of a new round of quantitative easing combined with a maturity twist. 
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explain what the global reaction is really about and why policy makers are 
reacting the way they are.
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 In November 2010 it was announced that the US Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) intends to purchase a further $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities 
and that it will reinvest an additional $250 billion to $300 billion in Treasury 
securities with the proceeds of its earlier investments. This quantitative easing with 
a maturity twist is nicknamed “QE II” and is has led to an hysterical outcry.
 Conventional quantitative easing is unlikely to be successful in a low interest rate 
environment. Theory also predicts that the maturity twist is unlikely to provide a 
significant enhancement.
 Recent experience, as well as theory, suggests that most of the increase in the 
monetary base resulting from QEII will end up as depository institutions’ excess 
reserves. There will be little impact on either US inflation or US competitiveness.
 The furore over QEII reveals deeper tensions over real exchange rates and global 
imbalances.
 The critical conflict is between the United States and emerging market nations that 
are running current account surpluses, in particular China. Another conflict is 
between the United States and advanced economies running surpluses, in particular 
Germany.
 The United States accuses China of keeoing down the value of the renminbi1 by 
intervening in currency markets and purchasing $2.4 trillion worth of reserves. This 
policy has subsidised their exports and allowed China to grow at the expense of the 
rest of the world. 
 Unemployment in the United States is high and the numbers of long-term 
unemployed are rising. In such an environment protectionism may be an appealing 
populist political strategy and the US President is no instinctive supporter of free 
trade.
 Taking what steps it can to help avoid a Sino-American trade war would be a good 
policy for the Eurozone.
The United States has announced a new round of quantitative easing. According to former 
Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan, it is “pursuing a policy of currency weakening”. 
This is denied by President Obama but foreign officials are not convinced. Japanese Prime 
Minister Naoto Kan said the US is pursuing a “weak-dollar policy”. Angela Merkel said the 
programme would "create extra problems for the world"; German Finance Minister 
Wolfgang Schäuble called the Federal Reserve’s move “clueless” and the German Economy 
Minister Rainer Brüderle accused the US of indirectly manipulating foreign exchange 
markets to its economic advantage. Brazilian central bank president Henrique Meirelles said 
it would cause "risks for everyone". China's Vice Finance Minister Zhu Guangyao said the 
US is not living up to its responsibility as an issuer of a global reserve currency. 
In the first half of this note I describe how the Federal Reserve’s version of quantitative 
easing works and why this new round is unlikely to significantly improve US 
competitiveness. In the second half I explain what the rest of the world is really angry 
about and what the US position is. I describe the major risk of this conflict for the Eurozone 
and the sensible Eurozone response. 
                                               
1 Renminbi means ‘the people’s currency’ and is the official generic name of the currency of China. Yuan is the 
name of a unit of this currency.
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1. The Likely Effects of the Federal Reserve’s New Round of 
Quantitative Easing
In November 2010 it was announced that the Federal Reserve intends to purchase a further 
$600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities, proceeding at a rate of about $75 billion per 
month. It also announced that it will reinvest an additional $250 billion to $300 billion in 
Treasury securities with the proceeds of its earlier investments. This second round of 
quantitative easing combined with a maturity twist, nicknamed QE II, has led to wide 
criticism. In this section I explain why the Federal Reserve has resorted to this measure 
and what it entails. I evaluate its likely effectiveness.
1.1 Monetary Policy in Normal Times
To see why the Federal Reserve has resorted to this quantitative easing, it is necessary to 
understand how monetary policy is normally done and why conventional monetary policy 
has stopped working. To explain this, I consider the simplified Federal Reserve System 
balance sheet in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1. Simplified Federal Reserve System Balance Sheet
Assets Liabilities








On the left-hand side of the balance sheet are the assets of the Federal Reserve. The first 
component of assets is the Federal Reserve’s holdings of public and private securities. The 
second component is repos, securities it temporarily holds as a result of its open-market 
operations. The third component is its loans to eligible counterparties. On the right-hand 
side of the balance sheet are the liabilities of the Federal Reserve. The first two 
components, currency in circulation and private deposit-taking institutions’ reserves held at 
the Federal Reserve, make up the monetary base. The third component is the Federal 
Reserve’s reverse repos, the depository institutions’ reserves temporarily held as a result of 
the Federal Reserve’s open market operations. Also on the right-hand side is the central 
bank’s net worth: the difference between its assets and its liabilities.
In normal times it is typical for modern central banks to make monetary policy by choosing 
a target short-term policy interest rate. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the 
Federal Reserve System targets the federal funds rate, the rate at which private deposit-
taking institutions lend balances at the Federal Reserve overnight to each other. The 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, acting as agent for the FOMC, conducts open-market 
operations to attain this targeted rate. In usual times this entails offsetting transitory 
changes in depository institutions’ reserves. If the central bank wants to increase these 
reserves it engages in repurchase agreements (“repos”). These operations are equivalent 
to short-term collateralised loans but technically they are arrangements where the Federal 
Reserve buys securities in exchange for reserves and agrees to subsequently resell them.2
As a result, the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet temporarily expands: the monetary base 
component of its liabilities rises, as does the repo component of its assets. If the Federal 
Reserve wants to decrease depository institutions’ reserves it engages in reverse repos. 
These are similar to short-term collateralised borrowing but technically they are an 
arrangement where the Federal Reserve sells assets in exchange for reserves and agrees to 
                                               
2 The Federal Reserve’s terminology is unusual for a central bank. Generally, a repo is an agreement to sell 
securities and then to buy them back at a later date. Thus, the Fed is viewing things from the point of view of the 
counterparty.
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subsequently repurchase them. Reverse repos have the effect of changing the composition 
of the Federal Reserve’s liabilities: the monetary base component falls and the reverse repo 
component rises.
To offset more permanent factors that would keep the federal funds rate from its target, 
the Federal Reserve must make a more permanent change in its balance sheet. To
permanently increase liquidity the Federal Reserve expands its balance sheet: purchasing 
securities and increasing the monetary base. To decrease liquidity it contracts its balance 
sheet: selling securities and decreasing the monetary base.
1.2 Why Usual Monetary Policy is not Working Now
Unfortunately for the FOMC, as well as other monetary policy committees around the world, 
by the time the global financial crisis started in earnest in September 2008, policy interest 
rates were already quite low and there was little scope to reduce them further. After the 
onset of the credit crisis in August 2007 the FOMC had cut its policy interest rate sharply. 
As seen in Figure 2 below, the federal funds target rate was 2.0 percent in September 
2008; by December of that year it had been reduced to 0 - .25 percent.
The rate chosen on 16 Dec 2008 was 0 - .25 percent.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Unable to make monetary policy by announcing lower target interest rates and achieving 
them through open-market operations, central banks have sought alternatives.3 A potential 
idea was that instead of announcing a policy interest rate, the central bank would simply 
engage in further expansionary open-market operations, selling home-currency 
denominated securities to increase the monetary base. This idea, referred to then as 
quantitative easing, was tried in Japan in 2000. 
Unfortunately, this simple type of quantitative easing did not work well there and theory 
suggests that simply increasing the monetary base is not effective when interest rates are 
near zero. In such a scenario the private sector is already holding as much money as it 
wants for transaction purposes and it perceives money and low-interest-bearing 
                                               
3 It is feasible to have a negative interest rate on money. See Buiter, Willem H. "Don't Raise the Inflation Target, 
Remove the Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates Instead", Citi Economics, Global Macro View, 5 March 2010. 
Unfortunately, it involves measures which are administratively costly or politically difficult. One way it can be done 
is by abolishing currency. Given the current political climate in the United States it is hard to imagine this being 
greeted with much enthusiasm.
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government securities as good substitutes. An increase in the monetary base accompanied 
by an equal-sized increase in central bank holdings of low-interest-bearing government 
securities, therefore produces little change in the behaviour of households and firms and 
hence, little change in nominal variables. With little change in nominal variables, even 
unanticipated monetary policy cannot produce much change in real variables. Conventional 
open-market operations are of little effect in a low-interest-rate environment.
1.3 What the Federal Reserve has Done so Far
In an attempt to free up illiquid markets and deal with failed financial institutions, central 
banks began to explore more unusual types of monetary policy. In the United States, the 
Federal Reserve bought the debt of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Home Loan 
banks, as well as mortgage-backed obligations guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and 
Ginnie Mae. It also engaged in other crisis-related activities such as the creation of the 
Maiden Lanes I, II and III vehicles. As shown in Figure 3 below, between the end of 2007 
and the end of 2008 the assets of the Federal Reserve System mushroomed from about 
$915 billion to $2,316 billion.
Figure 3. The Composition of the Federal Reserve System’s Assets
Source: Federal Reserve Board
The change in the Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet between the end of 2007 and the end of 
2008 was the result of a combination of garden-variety quantitative easing that increased 
the size of the Federal Reserve’s assets by about 250 percent and a change in the 
composition of its assets that increased their riskiness and reduced their liquidity. Such a 
change in the composition is referred to as qualitative easing, credit easing or – at the ECB 
– enhanced credit support.
Desperate for further ideas, on March 2009 the Federal Reserve announced a programme 
under which it purchased $300 billion of Treasury securities by Oct 2009. These included 
securities across the maturity spectrum, but most were of intermediate maturity. The idea 
behind this strategy is as follows. In Figure 4 below it is seen that the interest rate on US 
government securities increases, if rather languidly, in their maturity. One-year securities 
pay an interest rate of 0.23 percent. At five years one gets 1.18 percent and at ten years 
2.54 percent. There is not much scope to lower the one-year rate below 0.23 percent, but 
there is some room to reduce the ten-year rate below 2.54 percent. If long rates could be 
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lowered, this would boost demand directly, and also indirectly, by boosting the value of 
long-dated real assets such as equity, land and real estate and weakening the exchange 
rate. 
Source: Federal Reserve
This $300 billion operation was equivalent to conventional quantitative easing, where the 
Federal Reserve expands its holdings of low-interest-bearing short-maturity government 
debt, and an additional operation where the Fed swaps its short-maturity government debt 
for longer-term government debt. I have explained that the first part of the operation tends 
to be ineffective in a low-interest-rate environment so the success of this combined 
operation depends on the effectiveness of the swap component.
The idea of the Fed swapping debt of different maturities to change the yield curve is not 
new: it was tried briefly, with little obvious success, in the 1960s and was called Operation 
Twist. Unfortunately, as long as markets are efficient, economic theory predicts that such a 
move should have no impact. The government has a monopoly on issuing money; hence, 
its price depends on its supply. But, any household, firm or institution can issue debt and 
any debt held is one party’s asset and another’s liability. Its net supply is always zero in 
equilibrium and its price does not depend on the amount issued by any particular party.
1.4 How Effective has Monetary Policy Been?
None of the Federal Reserve’s actions since the crisis began have yet had an obvious direct 
stimulative effect on the economy, although the qualitative easing has helped indirectly by 
increasing liquidity and assisting in the restructuring of the banking system. As seen in 
Figure 5 below, the massive increase in the Federal Reserve System’s balance sheet 
featured an increase in the monetary base, but most of this was due to an increase in 
banks’ excess reserves. Banks are holding most of the increase in the money supply as 
deposits at the Federal Reserve.
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Figure 5. Excess Reserves and the Monetary Base
Source: Federal Reserve
As banks are not lending the increase in liquidity, the effect of the increase in the monetary 
base on broader measures of the money supply has been modest. This is seen in Figure 6 
below.
Figure 6. M1 and M2 (in billions of dollars, seasonally adjusted)
M1 is the blue line; M2 is the red line.
Source: Federal Reserve
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While obviously affected by other factors than monetary policy, inflation remains subdued. 
This is seen in Figure 7 below.
Source: InflationData.com
1.5 What is the Likely Effect of QEII?
As previously described the Federal Reserve recently announced a second round of 
quantitative easing combined with a maturity twist. If this QEII does work as intended, it 
will lower US long-term interest rates and weaken the dollar. Then, to the extent that the 
policy was unanticipated when currently outstanding contracts were signed, US 
competitiveness should increase at the expense of the United States’ trading partners. In 
practice, despite its hefty size – equal to roughly a quarter of the Federal Reserve System’s 
balance sheet – theory and the history of the past three years suggests that the operation 
is likely to produce a muted response. Most of the increase in Federal Reserve assets is 
likely to be matched by an increase in excess bank reserves. Changes in nominal variables 
are thus likely to be small and any change in competitiveness smaller still.
To sum up matters, the Federal Reserve’s planned quantitative easing with a twist is 
aggressive in its scale. While affecting the exchange rate might not be the primary motive 
for this operation, if it is successful then – as is the case with any monetary policy that is 
more expansionary than that of the rest of the world – the US might temporarily gain in 
competitiveness at the expense of its trading partners. However, recent experience 
suggests that the impact this current endeavour on the real exchange rate is likely to be 
small. 
2. Currency Wars and Global Imbalances
In this section I explain why QEII is so controversial and what the underlying motives of 
involved policy makers are. I describe the real threat to the Eurozone.
2.1 Why is QEII so Controversial?
If QEII is unlikely to be terribly effective, why was there so much hostility toward the US 
action? The consternation undoubtedly reflects some genuine concern that QEII might be 
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effective and that a lower real value of the dollar will threaten the ability of other countries 
to pursue export-led growth. However, this is probably not the entire reason: the anger, as 
well as recent the furore over currency wars is a symptom of the dissatisfaction with global 
imbalances, depicted in Figure 8 below and the policies that are believed to support them. 
In this section I discuss two separate issues. The first is the conflict between the United 
States and emerging market economies; the second is the conflict between the United 
States and the advanced economies that are running current account surpluses. I discuss 
how worried the Eurozone should be about these conflicts and what it can do.
Figure 8: Global imbalances, in billions of US dollars
New Asian economies: Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand
Middle East Oil economies: Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Unite Arab Emerates
Other Advanced economies: Eurozone countries other than Germany, Australia, the United Kingdom, 
Sweden, Norway and Switzerland
Source: IMF
2.2 The Conflict Between the United States and China
I first consider the conflict between the United States and emerging markets, and in 
particular the conflict between the United States and China. The most obvious features of 
Figure 8 are the mammoth US current account deficit, which had fallen sharply after the 
onset of the financial crisis but is now growing again, and the huge Chinese current account 
surplus.
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, developed economies are moribund: capital should 
be flowing from the developed world to the developing world, not the other way around. 
This has led to tensions, most notably between the United States and China.
Both China and the United States appear to feel aggrieved and there are two different 
stories that are told. In the first version of events, although reform is in process, China has 
been a country with a weak social safety net and underdeveloped infrastructure. It is 
natural that its savings should exceed its investment. The United States, meanwhile, is 
living beyond its means. This American profligacy is financed by a Chinese willingness to 
invest in the US. Any sizable and sudden appreciation of the Chinese currency now would 
tilt Chinese exporters into bankruptcy and possibly lead to dangerous political instability.
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In the second version of events, the Chinese surplus is due to an overvaluation of the 
renminbi.4 This overvaluation was accomplished by the Chinese intervening in currency 
markets and purchasing $2.4 trillion worth of reserves. This blatantly beggar-thy-neighbour 
policy has subsidised their exports and allowed China to grow at the expense of the rest of 
the world.5
After years of tolerating an over-valued Chinese currency, the United States has lost 
patience. In June of this year the Chinese permitted a small appreciation of the renminbi, 
but not enough to mollify the United States. On 29 September 2010 the US House of 
Representatives passed a bill giving the executive branch the authority to impose rather 
minimal trade sanctions on any country whose exchange rate is “fundamentally 
overvalued”.
One theory about the change in the United States’ attitude is that as long as the Chinese 
government was willing to invest its burgeoning reserves in US government securities, the 
US would look the other way. However, over the past year, China has apparently preferred 
to invest elsewhere.6 A supporting theory is that after the crisis, the United States would 
generally like emerging market countries to allow their exchange rates to appreciate and to 
remove barriers to the developed world’s exports. It believes that a successful campaign 
against China would pave the way to other countries acceding to its wishes. A third theory 
is that protectionism is an appealing political strategy in an economic slump.
It is likely that it is this new attitude of the United States towards China’s and other 
developing countries’ real exchange rates that has provoked the latest tempest. The United 
States may be seen as hypocritical in engaging in a policy that might temporarily lower the 
value of dollar. Or, perhaps, other countries find that focussing attention on QEII is a useful 
way of diverting attention from their own exchange rate policies.
2.3 The Conflict Between the United States and Germany
The second conflict that is highlighted by the response to QEII is the one between the 
United States and Germany. As seen in Figure 8 and Figure 9 (below), Germany has been 
running a sizable current account surplus.
From a German point of view, Germany’s aging population make a savings rate that is high 
by international standards but sensible. Moreover, it is typical that German recoveries are 
export led and a further expansion of German exports is desirable. The current level is 
certainly not due to currency manipulation or trade restrictions.
It is also seen from Figure 10 below that the obvious problem is not Germany, but the 
extraordinarily low level of US savings. Moreover, the recent dip in US savings cannot be 
accounted for by the US private sector. The IMF reports that US private savings as a 
percent of GDP was 15.2 and 17.3 in 2008 and 2009, respectively, and is projected to be 
19.3 in 2010. Rather, the US savings numbers are low because of irresponsible US fiscal 
policies. General government savings as a percent of GDP was -2.6 and -6.5 in 2008 and 
2009, respectively, and is projected to be -6.8 in 2010. The way to restore a sustainable 
US current account is US fiscal consolidation.
                                               
4 While acknowledging Chinese conerns, the most recent Article IV report says that IMF Staff believe that the 
renminbi remains substantially below the level that is consistent with medium-term fundamentals.
5 See, for example, Krugman, Paul, “Taking on China,” New York Times, New York Times, 30 Sep 2010.
6 See, for example,  Sinn, Hans-Werner, “Currency war: the guilt is not China’s alone,” Finfacts,  
http://www.finfacts.ie/irishfinancenews/article_1020973.shtml.
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Figure 9. Current Account Imbalances in the Eurozone 

























































Figure 10. US and German Savings and Investment as a Share of GDP
So
uSource: IMF
From a US point of view, however, the provocative feature of Figure 10 is German 
investment. While temporarily higher as a percent of GDP than US investment, it has 
been significantly lower for much of the past decade. Indeed, Germany’s net domestic 
investment as a percent of net national product was the lowest in the OECD for the 
period 1995 – 2008.7 The reason can be seen in Figure 11, below.
                                               
7 See Sinn, Hans-Werner, "Introduction," CESifo Forum 11, Autumn, 2010, 12 – 19.
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Figure 11. The United States has a More Flexible Economy than does Germany
Ease of Doing Business Index, 2010, 
World Bank




















































Source: World Bank, OECD
The table in Figure 11 indicates that the US economy is far more flexible than that of 
Germany. On the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index, the United States is fifth 
place, while Germany languishes at 22nd – behind Mauritius and Malaysia. According to the 
OECD’s index of product market regulation, the United States has the second least 
regulation; Germany the 14th. Given its demographics, it may be sensible for Germany to 
be running surpluses. But the excessive size of these surpluses owes much to distortionary 
economic policies: the US has been a more attractive place to invest. 
In addition, the United States would argue that it has a right to stimulate its economy in 
the current environment. If the Eurozone is worried about the effect of this on the 
exchange rate, it could engage in further stimulus as well. If Germany in particular is 
perturbed, some have suggested that additional German fiscal stimulus may be in order.8
While the tiff between the German government and the United States over their current 
account imbalances is probably not exactly at the top of the list of pressing Eurozone 
problems, the US squabble with China is of more importance. A full-blown trade war 
between these two nations could have serious global repercussions.
                                               
8 See, for example, Krugman, Paul, "What about Germany?" New York Times, 24 August 2010.
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2.4 The Threat to the Eurozone
So far the skirmishes in the US – China currency conflict have been small. The outlook, 
however, is worrying.
At 9.3 percent, unemployment in the United States is high, both by historical standards and 
compared to other countries. In Germany and the UK, for example, comparably measured 
unemployment is 7.8 and 7.7 percent, respectively.9 Moreover, the number of long-term 
unemployed has increased sharply in the United States. In the second quarter of 2010, 
46 percent of the unemployed had been jobless for more than 27 weeks and 31 percent 
had been jobless for more than 53 weeks. This is the sort of scenario that leads to a 
resentment of imported goods and a search for scapegoats. There is the disturbing 
possibility that a Democratic party that was badly behind in the polls before the next 
election might decide that protectionism is a policy with populist appeal.10 The decision to 
impose a tariff on Chinese tires in 2009, the “Buy American” provision in the stimulus 
package and the Patriot Employer Act all suggest that President Obama is no instinctive 
supporter of free trade.11
Averting a trade war is something that is in the Eurozone’s best interests. While it was not 
necessary, or even desirable, to support the US proposal for “indicative guidelines” on 
current account balances, a bit more equanimity on the part of German officials might have 
been helpful. Promoting a balanced debate would have been preferable to fanning the 
flames of a currency war. The world should not count on the United States acting as the 
world’s international consumer of last resort indefinitely and Eurozone policymakers should 
support the United States’ call for the major emerging economies to allow more flexibility in 
their exchange rates and to rely more on domestic-led demand for growth.
                                               
9 US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
10 See Rogoff, Kenneth, “Beware of Wounded Lions,” Project Syndicate, 2 Nov 2010, http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/rogoff74/English.
11 See Buiter, Willem and Anne Sibert, “The dangerous protectionism of Barack Obama,” www.voxeu.org, 26 Feb 
2008.
